Time Synchronization Attack and Countermeasure for Multi-System
  Scheduling in Remote Estimation by Guo, Ziyang et al.
1Time Synchronization Attack and Countermeasure
for Multi-System Scheduling in Remote Estimation
Ziyang Guo∗, Yuqing Ni∗, Wing Shing Wong†, Ling Shi∗
Abstract—We consider time synchronization attack against
multi-system scheduling in a remote state estimation scenario
where a number of sensors monitor different linear dynamical
processes and schedule their transmissions through a shared
collision channel. We show that by randomly injecting relative
time offsets on the sensors, the malicious attacker is able to
make the expected estimation error covariance of the overall
system diverge without any system knowledge. For the case
that the attacker has full system information, we propose an
efficient algorithm to calculate the optimal attack, which spoofs
the least number of sensors and leads to unbounded average
estimation error covariance. To mitigate the attack consequence,
we further propose a countermeasure by constructing shift
invariant transmission policies and characterize the lower and
upper bounds for system estimation performance. Simulation
examples are provided to illustrate the obtained results.
Index Terms—Remote State Estimation; Time Synchronization
Attack; Shift Invariance; Multi-system Scheduling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) refer to systems integrating
sensing, computation, communication and control techniques
with physical processes. With wide applications in different
critical infrastructures such as smart grids, intelligent trans-
portation and health monitoring system, CPS have attracted
great research interest during the past decade [1]. In such
systems, wireless sensors play an indispensable role due to
advantages such as low cost, easy installation, self-power and
inherent intelligent processing capability [2]. However, new
issues arise naturally with the widespread deployment.
Since most wireless sensors in practical applications are
battery-powered, and replacing old batteries which run out of
energy is usually costly or even impossible in some extreme
environments, one critical issue is how to efficiently allocate
the transmission power of the sensors. In [3], the authors
studied the scheduling problem of whether to send the sensory
data to the remote estimator or not under transmission energy
constraint and obtained the optimal off-line sensor schedule.
In [4], the authors proposed an on-line sensor schedule based
on the acknowledgment signal which contains the real-time
data-dropout information. It was shown in [5] that the on-
line sensor schedule improves the estimation performance
significantly compared with the off-line case with only a 1-bit
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feedback. Besides the above works focusing on single-sensor
systems, multi-sensor and multi-system scheduling problems
have received more attention recently [6]–[8]. Specifically,
a sensor scheduling problem was investigated for a multi-
sensor system under communication constraints in [6] and the
optimal sensor selection schemes were obtained for reliable
and packet-dropping channels. The design of a collision-free
transmission scheduling for multiple linear dynamical systems
was studied in [7] and an asymptotic periodic schedule was
proved to be optimal. Moreover, the multi-system scheduling
problem was extended to the scenario with packet drop and
packet length constraint in [8].
Due to the wireless communication modes and the com-
plex interconnection between cyber information layer and
physical components, communication channels are vulnerable
to malicious attacks, which may raise security issues in
CPS. Availability attacks, also known as Denial-of-Service
attacks, which block the communication channels and prevent
legitimate access to system components, were investigated
for resource-constrained attacker in [9], [10]. Integrity at-
tacks, another main category of cyber attacks, attempt to
cripple the system functionality while remaining undetectable
by intercepting and modifying the transmitted data packets.
Different implementations of integrity attacks were studied,
including replay attack [11], false-data injection attack [12],
[13], innovation-based deception attack [14], [15], etc.
Note that most of the multi-system scheduling problems
considered in the literature [6]–[8] assume that all the sub-
systems are working in a synchronous manner. Since Global
Positioning System (GPS) signal is highly accurate, stable
and free for timing, GPS-based measuring devices have been
vastly deployed in critical infrastructures to guarantee the
time synchronization between subsystems and thus achieve
desirable performance [16]. However, malicious agents may
disturb the time synchronization among sensors by introducing
counterfeit GPS signals. Some existing works [17]–[19] and
real world GPS spoofing attacks [20] have shown the vulner-
ability of GPS signals and the possibility of spoofing the GPS
receivers. Any successful time synchronization attack, which
injects relative offsets on sensor clocks and desynchronizes the
target system, may lead to a huge performance degradation.
Motivated by these observations, we consider such an attack
scenario in this work and analyze performance degradations
for different attack information sets. To mitigate the attack ef-
fect, we further propose a defense strategy using transmission
policies with shift invariance property. The main contributions
of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We consider time synchronization attack against multi-
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2system scheduling and analyze the attack consequences
for different scenarios. For the case that the attacker has
no system knowledge, we show that it is possible to drive
the expected estimation error covariance of the overall
system to infinity (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). For the
case that the attacker has full system knowledge, we pro-
pose an efficient algorithm to calculate the optimal attack
strategy that spoofs the least number of sensors and leads
to unbounded estimation error covariance (Theorem 2
and Algorithm 1).
2) To mitigate the attack consequence, we propose a coun-
termeasure by constructing shift invariant transmission
policies and derive the lower and upper bounds for
the remote estimation error covariance when using the
proposed countermeasure (Theorem 3). Moreover, we
provide a procedure to construct the shift invariant trans-
mission policies.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the system architecture and preliminaries
about the multi-system scheduling. Section III considers time
synchronization attack with or without system knowledge
and analyzes the attack consequences. Section IV proposes
a countermeasure by constructing shift invariant transmission
policies and derives performance bounds of remote estimation
error covariance. Simulation examples are provided in Section
V. Some concluding remarks are made in the end.
Notations: All vectors and matrices are named in boldface
while scalars are not. N and R denote the sets of nonnegative
integers and real numbers. Rn is the n-dimensional Euclidean
space. Sn+ (Sn++) is the set of n × n positive semi-definite
(definite) matrices. When X ∈ Sn+ (Sn++) , we simply write
X  0 (X  0). b·c means the floor function. For functions
f, f1, f2, f1 ◦f2 is defined as f1 ◦f2(X) , f1(f2(X)) and fk
is defined as fk(X) , f ◦ f ◦ · · · ◦ f︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
(X) with f0(X) = X .
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
Consider a system consisting of N independent discrete
linear time-invariant processes and N sensors as depicted in
Fig. 1. The i-th sensor monitors the i-th process:
xi(k + 1) = Aixi(k) +wi(k), (1)
yi(k) = Cixi(k) + vi(k), (2)
where i ∈ N , {1, 2, ..., N}, k ∈ N is the time index,
xi(k) ∈ Rni is the state of the i-th process, yi(k) ∈ Rmi
is the measurement obtained by the i-th sensor. The process
noise wi(k), measurement noise vi(k) and the initial state
xi(0) are mutually independent zero-mean Gaussian random
variables with covariance Qi  0, Ri  0 and Πi  0,
respectively. To avoid trivial problem, all the processes are
assumed to be unstable. The pair (Ai,Ci) is detectable and
(Ai,
√
Qi) is stabilizable.
B. Smart Sensor
With the development of manufacturing techniques, many
modern sensors are able to provide extra functions beyond
Fig. 1. System block diagram.
those necessary for generating the measured quantity. The
functions embedded might be signal processing, decision-
making and anomaly alarm, which may promote the system
performance [21]. In this work, each sensor is assumed to be
smart in the sense that it is able to measure the state of its
corresponding process and run the following Kalman filter to
generate a local estimate:
xˆ`−i (k) = Aixˆ
`
i(k − 1),
P `−i (k) = AiP
`
i (k − 1)A>i +Qi,
K`i (k) = P
`−
i (k)C
>
i [CiP
`−
i (k)C
>
i +Ri]
−1,
xˆ`i(k) = xˆ
`−
i (k) +K
`
i (k)[yi(k)−Cixˆ`−i (k)],
P `i (k) = [Ini −K`i (k)Ci]P `−i (k),
where xˆ`−i (k) and xˆ
`
i(k) are the a priori and the a posteriori
minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimates of the state
xi(k) at the i-th sensor, P `−i (k) and P
`
i (k) are the corre-
sponding estimation error covariances. The recursion starts
from xˆ`i(0) = 0 and P
`
i (0) = Πi.
To facilitate the subsequent discussion, we define the Lya-
punov and Riccati operators hi and gi : Sni+ 7→ Sni+ as follows:
hi(X) , AiXA>i +Qi,
gi(X) ,X −XC>i (CiXC>i +Ri)−1CiX.
Under the detectability and stabilizability assumptions, the
estimation error covariance associated with each local Kalman
filter converges exponentially to a steady state from any initial
condition [22]. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
Kalman filter at sensor side has entered steady state, i.e.,
P `i (k) = P i,∀k ∈ N,
where P i  0 is a unique positive semi-definite solution of
discrete algebraic Riccati equation X = gi ◦ hi(X).
C. Remote Estimator
We consider a time-slotted communication channel which is
shared by N sensors. It is assumed that the remote estimator
only has the ability to successfully receive one data packet at
3each time k. In other words, when two or more sensors trans-
mit simultaneously, collision occurs and all the transmitted
data packets will be dropped. To schedule the transmission, a
time-synchronized transmission scheduler embedded in each
sensor makes a decision to determine whether to transmit
or not. Specifically, we denote θi(k) : N 7→ {0, 1} be
the transmission policy of sensor i at time k. If the local
estimate xˆ`i(k) is scheduled to transmit, θi(k) = 1; otherwise
θi(k) = 0. Let θ(k) , {θ1(k), θ2(k), . . . , θN (k)}, θ ,
{θ(1), θ(2), . . .}, and Θ be the set of all feasible schedules.
Moreover, we denote λi(k) =
∏
j 6=i,j∈N θi(k)[1 − θj(k)] to
indicate the transmission result of sensor i at time k. If the
local estimate xˆ`i(k) is successfully received at the remote
estimator, λi(k) = 1; otherwise λi(k) = 0.
As a result, the MMSE state estimate xˆi(k) and the cor-
responding estimation error covariance Pi(k) at the remote
estimator can be computed by the following recursions:
xˆi(k) =
{
xˆ`i(k), if λi(k) = 1,
Aixˆi(k − 1), if λi(k) = 0,
(3)
Pi(k) =
{
P i, if λi(k) = 1,
hi(Pi(k − 1)), if λi(k) = 0.
(4)
Note that the estimation error covariance satisfies
ht1i (P i)  ht2i (P i) (5)
for any t1, t2 ∈ N with t1 ≥ t2 [23]. Furthermore,
Tr
[
ht1i (P i)
] ≥ Tr [ht2i (P i)] . (6)
This well ordering of the estimation error covariance is helpful
for the further analysis.
D. Optimal Sensor Scheduling
For the considered collision channel, an efficient sensor
scheduling scheme plays a crucial role to system estimation
performance, which motivates us to consider the following
optimization problem:
min
θ∈Θ
J(θ) , lim sup
K→∞
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
N∑
i=1
Tr [Pi(k)] (7)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
λi(k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ N.
The above problem was already studied in [7] and we sum-
marize the main results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The optimal transmission policy θ∗ for the opti-
mization problem in (7) has the following properties:
1) Exclusivity: there must be one and only one sensor which
transmits at each time k;
2) Periodicity: there exists a period T ∈ N such that
θ∗i (k) = θ
∗
i (k + T ),∀i ∈ N ;
3) Uniformity: each sensor must schedule its transmission
as uniformly as possible within one period.
Proof: See Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 in [7].
E. Problem of Interest
There is no doubt that the minimum average estimation
error covariance over an infinite time horizon can be achieved
when applying the optimal sensor schedules. However, if
there exists a malicious attacker who aims at damaging the
estimation quality, i.e., maximizing the objective function J(θ)
by choosing an appropriate attack strategy, the situation will
become more involved, which motivates our current work. In
this case, the defense strategies that help the system maintain
acceptable performance even in the presence of attacks are
worth exploring. We will introduce the detailed attack model
and propose countermeasures in the following two sections.
III. ATTACK STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the scenario where there exists
a malicious attacker who is able to generate random delays on
the clocks of the sensors to increase collision, consequently
packet dropout, during the transmission. The mathematical
formulation and practical implementation of such an attack
are discussed. Moreover, the remote estimation performances
when the malicious attacker has different system information
are investigated and an efficient algorithm is proposed to
calculate the optimal attack strategy.
A. Time Synchronization Attack
To achieve the optimal transmission policy obtained in [7],
GPS timing is applied such that each sensor in the system
transmits data packet in a synchronous manner without any
collision. We consider a malicious attacker who intentionally
disturbs the time synchronization among sensors by injecting
arbitrary time delays on sensor clocks. Practically, this can
be achieved by introducing a forged GPS signal, as shown in
Fig. 1. Note that such an attacker does not need to hack into
the underlying system or have physical contact to the sensors.
It is also difficult to locate the attacker since it can transmit the
GPS spoofing signal while moving around the target sensors.
These injected time delays may lead to transmission collision,
packet dropout and performance degradation. Consequently,
it is necessary to analyze attack consequences under different
information sets and propose efficient countermeasures, before
which some definitions are introduced first.
According to Lemma 1, the optimal transmission policy for
each sensor is a periodic 0-1 sequence. Thus, it suffices to
investigate the attack effect on sensor’s transmission within
one period instead of an infinite horizon. To simplify the
subsequent discussion, we denote the optimal transmission
policy si for sensor i within period T as a column vector:
si ,
[
si(0), si(1), . . . , si(T − 1)
]>
, (8)
where si(k) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T −1}.
Let s , {s1, s2, . . . , sN} be the optimal transmission policy
of all sensors. The Hamming weight of sensor i is the number
of ones in si within a period. The duty factor of sensor i is
the fraction of time in which sensor i is transmitting, which
equals the Hamming weight divided by the period, i.e.,
fi ,
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
si(k).
4When a random time delay τi is injected on the clock of the
i-th sensor by the GPS spoofer, the transmission policy of
sensor i becomes
s
(τi)
i ,
[
s
(τi)
i (0), s
(τi)
i (1), . . . , s
(τi)
i (T − 1)
]>
=
[
si(0⊕ τi), si(1⊕ τi), . . . , si((T − 1)⊕ τi)
]>
, (9)
where ⊕ represents addition modulo T .
B. Attack without System Knowledge
In this subsection, we focus on the scenario where the
malicious attacker does not have any system knowledge and
randomly launches attacks on an arbitrary subset of the sen-
sors. In this regard, we can show that the expected average
estimation error covariance of the overall system over an
infinite time horizon goes to infinity. This result can be
obtained directly from the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any optimal transmission policy s with period
T , there exists an attack strategy under which all the trans-
mitted data packets of sensor i will be dropped if fi ≤ 12 .
Proof: The proof is divided into two parts. The two-sensor
scenario is considered first, and as an extension, the proof of
the scenario with N sensors is completed.
First, without loss of generality, we assume that f1 ≤ f2
in the two-sensor scenario, which means that the sensor 1
transmits Tf1 times and the sensor 2 transmits Tf2 times in
one period T . For each transmission policy θ, the resulting
average cost J(θ) in the Problem 1 can be computed:
J(θ) =
1
T
{ Tf2∑
t=0
at Tr
[
ht1
(
P 1
)]
+
Tf1∑
t=0
bt Tr
[
ht2
(
P 2
)]}
,
(10)
where at and bt are nonnegative integers satisfying
Tf2∑
t=0
at =
Tf1∑
t=0
bt = T, a0 = Tf1, b0 = Tf2, (11)
a0 ≥ a1 ≥ · · · ≥ aTf2 , b0 ≥ b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bTf1 , (12)
a0 = Tf1 represents the total number of time slots in a period
T when sensor 1 is scheduled to transmit, and at, t ≥ 1
stands for the total number of time slots that sensor 1 has
continuously idled for t slots after a transmission. Sensor
1 needs to transmit for exactly Tf1 times in a period T ,
and thus the longest waiting time duration during which it
cannot transmit is T − Tf1 = Tf2. The counting number
summation for sensor 1, denoted as
∑Tf2
t=0 at, must be T .
Sensor 2 has similar situations represented by bt. The case
that the sensor i has not been scheduled to transmit for t+ 1
time slots can happen only if it has not been scheduled for t
time slots. Therefore, the inequality (12) holds. To illustrate
the meanings of at and bt, we provide a simple example in
Fig. 2. A transmission policy in the two-sensor scenario with
T = 7, f1 =
2
7 and f2 =
5
7 is considered. The corresponding
a0 = 2, a1 = 2, a2 = 2, a3 = 1, a4 = a5 = 0 and
b0 = 5, b1 = 2, b2 = 0.
1 0 1 1 0 1 1Sensor 2
0 1 0 0 1 0 0Sensor 1
Fig. 2. Transmission policy of two sensors with period T = 7
Due to the nondecreasing property of Tr
[
hti
(
P i
)]
in t and
Lemma 1, the average estimation error covariance under the
optimal transmission policy θ∗ can be obtained as:
J(θ∗) =
1
T
{
a0 Tr
[
h01
(
P 1
)]
+ a0 Tr
[
h11
(
P 1
)]
+ · · ·
+ a0 Tr
[
h
b Ta0 c−1
1
(
P 1
) ]
+ (T mod a0) Tr
[
h
b Ta0 c
1
(
P 1
) ]
+ b0 Tr
[
h02
(
P 2
)]
+ (T − b0) Tr
[
h12
(
P 2
)]}
.
(13)
In consistency with the Uniformity in Lemma 1, the sensor
2 with the larger duty factor f2 is only allowed to wait for
at most one time slot under the optimal scheduling policy.
In other words, all the “0” elements in s2 are isolated by
other “1” elements. According to the Exclusivity in Lemma 1,
all the “1” elements in s1 are isolated by other “0” elements.
Consequently, the attacker can always set τ2 = 1 and construct
s
(1)
2 such that all the “1” elements in s1 collide with those “1”
elements in s(1)2 .
For the general scenario with N sensors, any sensor i with
fi ≤ 12 satisfies that “1” elements in si isolated by other “0”
elements according to the Uniformity, which can be viewed as
sensor 1 in the two-sensor scenario. Then, all the other sensors
can be viewed together as sensor 2 in the two-sensor scenario.
Similar to the previous case, there always exist a delayed ver-
sion of sequences s(τ1)1 , s
(τ2)
2 , . . . , s
(τi−1)
i−1 , s
(τi+1)
i+1 , . . . , s
(τN )
N
with τj = 1,∀j ∈ N\{i} such that all the transmitted data
packets of sensor i are dropped in collisions.
Corollary 1 Consider system (1)–(2) under optimal transmis-
sion policy s with period T . When a randomly generated time
synchronization attack is launched on the system, the expected
average estimation error covariance of the overall system over
an infinite time horizon goes to infinity, i.e.,
lim sup
K→∞
1
K
K−1∑
k=0
N∑
i=1
E{Tr [Pi(k)]} =∞. (14)
Proof: Theorem 1 shows that for any system under the
optimal transmission policy s, there always exists an attack
strategy such that at least one sensor, e.g., sensor i, will never
have a chance to successfully transmit its data packet. Corre-
spondingly, the trace of estimation error covariance Tr [Pi(k)]
diverges to infinity for this unstable process. Note that the
attack strategy is randomly chosen from all the finite types of
time synchronization attacks. Hence, the equation (14) holds,
taking expectation with respect to random attack strategies.
5C. Attack with full System Knowledge
When the malicious attacker has knowledge of all system
parameters Ai, Ci, Qi and Ri, ∀i ∈ N , it is able to calculate
the optimal sensor schedules and launch an attack such that the
average estimation error covariance of the overall system goes
to infinity, i.e., lim supK→∞
1
K
∑K−1
k=0
∑N
i=1 Tr [Pi(k)] =∞.
Note that the attacks leading to unbounded estimation error
covariance are not unique. Hence, the optimal attack strategy
that spoofs the least number of sensors to achieve this goal
is worth investigating. In this subsection, we first show that
the optimal attack strategy can be solved by the optimization
problem summarized in the following theorem and then pro-
vide an efficient algorithm to solve this problem. For notation
brevity, we denote
Si , [s(1)i , s
(2)
i , . . . , s
(T−1)
i ] ∈ {0, 1}T×(T−1)
as all possible attacked version of si,
Γi , [γ(1)i , γ
(2)
i , . . . , γ
(T−1)
i ]
> ∈ {0, 1}T−1
as an indicator vector corresponds to Si, and ei being (T −
1)(N−1) dimensional vector with N−1 partitions and all the
elements in the i-th partition are ones. Moreover, we define
S−i , [S1, . . . ,Si−1,Si+1, . . . ,SN ] ∈ {0, 1}T×(T−1)(N−1),
Γ−i , [Γ>1 , . . . ,Γ>i−1,Γ>i+1, . . . ,Γ>N ]> ∈ {0, 1}(T−1)(N−1),
and E = [e>1 , e
>
2 , . . . , e
>
N−1]
> ∈ {0, 1}(N−1)×(T−1)(N−1).
Theorem 2 Consider system (1)–(2) under optimal transmis-
sion policy s with period T . The optimal attack strategy can
be obtained by solving the following optimization problem for
all i ∈ N :
P1 : min
Γ−i
‖Γ−i‖1
s.t. DiΓ−i e bi
Γ−i ∈e {0, 1},
where bi ,
[
si
1
]
∈ {0, 1}T+N−1, Di ,
[−S−i
E
]
∈
{0, 1}(T+N−1)×(T−1)(N−1), ‖x‖1 stands for l1 norm of x,
e is element-wise inequality, x ∈e {0, 1} means that each
element of x belongs to {0, 1}.
Proof: According to the definition, an attack strategy is
optimal with respect to sensor i if it spoofs the least number
of sensors except sensor i such that all the transmitted data
packets of sensor i are dropped. Consequently, to obtain the
optimal attack strategy with respect to sensor i, we need to
solve the following optimization problem:
P2 : min
Γ−i
‖Γ−i‖1
s.t. S−iΓ−i − si e 0
Γj ∈e {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N\{i}
‖Γj‖1 e 1, ∀j ∈ N\{i}.
Since injecting a time delay τj on sensor j, can be represented
as the multiplication of Sj , the matrix of all possible attacked
version of sj , and its corresponding indicator Γj , any attack
strategy satisfying the first two constraints guarantees that at
least one sensor j ∈ N\{i} is also transmitting its data packet
Algorithm 1 B&B Algorithm for Optimal Attack Strategy
1: Initialization: tempi = +∞, N ilive = N−i, N idel = ∅,
Γ−i(N idel) = ∅, ∀i ∈ N , valopt = +∞, solopt = 0;
2: for i = 1 : N do
3: Γ ∗−i = B&B(N ilive,N idel,Γ−i(N idel), tempi)
4: if ‖Γ ∗−i‖1 < valopt then
5: valopt = ‖Γ ∗−i‖1
6: solopt = Γ
∗
−i
7: end if
8: end for
9: function B&B(N ilive,N idel,Γ−i(N idel), tempi)
10: Solve the following convex optimization problem:
min
Γ−i
‖Γ−i‖1
s.t. DiΓ−i e bi
Γ−i(N ilive) ∈e [0, 1]
Γ−i(N−i\N ilive) = Γ−i(N idel)
11: if the solution Γ sol−i exists and ‖Γ sol−i ‖1 < tempi then
12: if the solution Γ sol−i is in binary form then
13: tempi = ‖Γ sol−i ‖1
14: return Γ sol−i
15: else
16: Choose j ∈ N ilive and define:
N˜ ilive = N ilive\{j}
N˜ idel = N idel ∪ {j}
Γ˜−i,0(N idel) = Γ−i(N idel) ∪ {Γj = 0}
Γ˜−i,1(N idel) = Γ−i(N idel) ∪ {Γj = e1}
...
Γ˜−i,T−1(N idel) = Γ−i(N idel) ∪ {Γj = eT−1}
17: Solve the problem for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}:
Γ sol−i,k = B&B(N˜ ilive, N˜ idel, Γ˜−i,k(N idel), tempi)
18: Γ˜ sol−i = argmin
{Γ sol−i,0,...,Γ sol−i,T−1}
{‖Γ sol−i,0‖1, . . . , ‖Γ sol−i,T−1‖1}
19: if ‖Γ˜ sol−i ‖1 < tempi then
20: tempi = ‖Γ˜ sol−i ‖1
21: return Γ˜ sol−i
22: else
23: return null
24: end if
25: end if
26: else
27: return null
28: end if
29: end function
at the time slot when sensor i is transmitting. Note that only
one time delay can be injected on each sensor j ∈ N\{i},
which leads to the third constraint. It can be observed that
all the transmitted data packets of sensor i will be dropped
under any attack strategy satisfying above three constraints.
To obtain the optimal attack, one has to minimize the number
of sensors needed to be spoofed, which corresponds to the l1
norm in the objective function.
Combining the first and the third constraints of problem P2,
one can obtain problem P1, which completes the proof.
Due to the binary constraint on Γ−i, problem P1 is a
mixed integer programming problem, which cannot be solved
by standard convex optimization techniques. Noticing that
6Γ−i ∈e {0, 1} has 2(T−1)(N−1) possible values, a brute-force
enumeration for the optimal attack strategy is computationally
intractable when the network scale N or the communication
period T is large.
Among various algorithms in the literature [24], Branch-
and-Bound (B&B) algorithm is the most popular one to solve
large scale NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems [25].
Although the algorithm may need to search the entire solution
space in the worst case, the use of bounds for the function
to be optimized combined with the value of the current best
solution enables the algorithm to search a smaller solution
space in general. To be specific, we denote N ilive,N idel ⊆
N−i , N\{i} as two sub-index sets of N−i for sensor i,
and Γ−i(N ilive),Γ−i(N idel) as the corresponding collections
of elements from Γ−i, respectively. We summarize the B&B
algorithm for optimal attack strategy in Algorithm 1.
Remark 1 Note that the optimal attack strategy that spoofs
the least number of sensors and leads to unbounded estimation
error covariance may not be unique. The method summarized
in Algorithm 1 only returns one of the optimal attack strate-
gies. If all the optimal attack strategies are needed, one can
easily achieve this goal by modifying “<” in lines 11 and 19
to “≤” and storing all the returned solutions.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST TIME
SYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK
According to the previous discussion, the optimal trans-
mission policy for each sensor is periodic and synchronized.
When a malicious attacker intentionally destroys time synchro-
nization between sensors, nonzero relative offsets are injected
and the collided data packets are dropped, which results in
degradation of remote estimation performance. To ensure the
estimation quality in the presence of time synchronization
attacks, we propose a countermeasure based on shift invariant
property of the transmission policy in this section. Moreover,
we derive the lower and upper bounds of remote estimation
error covariance when the proposed defense method is used.
A. Shift Invariance
Before proceeding the analysis, we first introduce the defi-
nition of shift invariant transmission policy in this subsection.
Let UN be the collection of all ordered tuples of length
1, 2, . . . , N , whose components are distinct elements in sensor
set N and sorted in ascending order. It consists of n-tuples
in the form (i1, i2, . . . , in) for some n between 1 and N , and
i1 < i2 < · · · < in. An element in UN corresponds to an
ordered tuple of sensors. For U = (i1, i2, . . . , in) ∈ UN with
i1 < i2 < · · · < in, the Hamming cross correlation associated
with U is defined as
H(τ1, τ2, . . . , τn;U) ,
T−1∑
k=0
n∏
j=1
s
(τj)
ij
(k). (15)
In other words, it counts the number of time slots in a
period where all sensors in U transmit simultaneously. When
U consists of only one sensor, Hamming cross correlation
reduces to Hamming weight.
A function F : {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}n 7→ N is said to be shift
invariant if F (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn) equals identically to a constant
for any choice of τ1, τ2, . . . , τn. We say a transmission pol-
icy set {s1, s2, . . . , sN} is shift invariant if the Hamming
cross correlation in (15) is shift invariant as a function of
τ1, τ2, . . . , τn for all U ∈ UN .
When the sensors in the ordered tuple U =
(i1, i2, . . . , in) ∈ UN are active and the time delay injected
by the attacker of sensor ij is τj for j = 1, 2 . . . , n, the
throughput of sensor ij is defined as
θj(τ1, τ2, . . . , τn;U) ,
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
s
τj
ij
(k)
∏
t6=j
(
1− sτtit (k)
)
, (16)
where the product is over all t = 1, 2, . . . , n except t = j. This
is the fraction of time slots in which sensor ij transmits and
sensors i1, . . . , ij−1, ij+1, . . . , in keep silent. When U consists
of only one sensor, the throughput θ(τ ; (i)) is equivalent to the
duty factor fi. A transmission policy set {s1, s2, . . . , sN} is
throughput invariant if the throughput in (16) is shift invariant
as a function for all U ∈ UN and j = 1, 2 . . . , n. According
to Theorem 8 and Theorem 12 in [26], the shift invariance
and throughput invariance are equivalent for the transmission
channel considered in our work.
Example 1 The following is a set of three shift invariant
transmission policies with duty factors f1 = 12 , f2 =
1
2 ,
f3 =
1
3 and period T = 12:
s1 =
[
0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1
]>
,
s2 =
[
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1
]>
,
s3 =
[
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0
]>
.
Then, we have H(τ1, τ2; (1, 2)) = 3, H(τ1, τ3; (1, 3)) = 2,
H(τ2, τ3; (2, 3)) = 2 and H(τ1, τ2, τ3; (1, 2, 3)) = 1 for all
τ1, τ2, τ3 ∈ N.
B. Performance Bounds
Note that the shift invariance property introduced in the
previous subsection can be used to design countermeasures
against time synchronization attack. When shift invariant
transmission policies are adopted, each sensor will receive at
least one data packet within a period no matter what time
delays are injected on the system, which leads to bounded
estimation error covariance and improves system robustness.
In this subsection, we provide the lower and upper bounds
for the remote estimation error covariance when using shift
invariant transmission policies, before which we first revisit
some useful results obtained in [27].
Lemma 2 Let s1, s2, . . . , sN be shift invariant transmission
policies for N sensors with duty factors f1 = n1d1 , f2 =n2
d2
, . . . , fN =
nN
dN
, respectively, and gcd(ni, di) = 1,∀i ∈ N .
Then, the following statements hold:
1) The throughput of sensor i is equal to fi
∏
j 6=i(1− fj);
2) The period is divisible by and no less than d1d2 · · · dN .
Proof: See Theorem 3 and Theorem 6 in [27].
7Theorem 3 Consider system (1)–(2) under shift invariant
transmission policies s1, s2, . . . , sN with duty factors f1 =
n1
d1
, f2 =
n2
d2
, . . . , fN =
nN
dN
, gcd(ni, di) = 1,∀i ∈ N , and pe-
riod D = d1d2 · · · dN . When an arbitrary time synchronization
attack is launched on the system, the average estimation error
covariance of the overall system over an infinite time horizon
is lower bounded by
J(θ) =
1
D
N∑
i=1
{
Ni Tr
[
h0i (P )
]
+Ni Tr
[
h1i (P )
]
+ · · ·
+Ni Tr
[
h
b DNi c−1
i (P )
]
+ (D mod Ni) Tr
[
h
b DNi c
i (P )
]}
(17)
and upper bounded by
J(θ) =
1
D
N∑
i=1
{
Ni Tr
[
h0i (P )
]
+ Tr
[
h1i (P )
]
+ Tr
[
h2i (P )
]
+ · · ·+ Tr [h(D−Ni)i (P )]}, (18)
where Ni = ni
∏
j 6=i(dj − nj) for all i ∈ N .
Proof: According to Lemma 2, when sensor i adopts shift
invariant transmission policy si with duty factor fi = nidi and
period D = d1d2 · · · dN , it will receive Ni = Dfi
∏
j 6=i(1 −
fj) = ni
∏
j 6=i(dj −nj) data packets within one period under
arbitrary time synchronization attack.
Consequently, the lower bound of the average estimation
error covariance over an infinite time horizon of the overall
system is achieved when all the data packets are uniformly
received, which corresponds to (17). The upper bound is
achieved when all the data packets are consecutively received,
which is consistent with (18).
C. Construction Method
In this subsection, we describe how to construct the shift
invariant transmission policies with duty factor 0 < fi = nidi <
1 and gcd(ni, di) = 1,∀i ∈ N .
In our construction, the i-th transmission policy has period
Di ,
∏i
j=1 di and DN = d1d2 · · · dN = D is the common
period for the whole transmission policy set. For convenience,
D0 is defined to be 1. Then, the shift invariant transmission
policy for sensor i, i ∈ N , is constructed as follows. Select
Di−1 vectors of length di, say σi1,σi2, . . . ,σiDi−1 , such
that the Hamming weights of them are all equal to ni, and
interleave these Di−1 vectors in the following manner:
[σi1(0),σi2(0), . . . ,σiDi−1(0),
σi1(1),σi2(1), . . . ,σiDi−1(1), . . . ,
σi1(di − 1),σi2(di − 1), . . . ,σiDi−1(di − 1) ]> .
Example 2 For N = 2 with duty factors f1 = 14 and f2 =
1
3 ,
we pick σ11 = [0, 0, 0, 1]>, σ21 = [0, 0, 1]>, σ22 = [0, 1, 0]>
and σ23 = σ24 = [1, 0, 0]>. The two constructed shift
invariant transmission policies are
s1 =
[
0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1
]>
,
s2 =
[
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0
]>
with period T = 12. The first policy is obtained by repeating
[0, 0, 0, 1]> periodically. The second policy is obtained by
reading out the rows from top to bottom of matrix
[σ21,σ22,σ23,σ24] =
0 0 1 10 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 .
Observed from Example 2, different shift invariant transmis-
sion policies can be obtained by choosing different duty factors
and σij , where i ∈ N , j = 1, 2, . . . , Di−1. Two heuristic
construction methods are considered in this work: one is to
construct shift invariant transmission policies that preserve the
same duty factors of the optimal transmission policies without
attacks; the other is to construct shift invariant transmission
policies that achieve the shortest period. Note that the shortest
period 2N is achieved when the duty factor is fi = 12 for all
i ∈ N . Particularly, in this case, each sensor receives exactly
one packet within a period, and thus the lower bound J(θ)
coincides with the upper bound J(θ). These two construction
methods will be compared through simulation examples in the
next section.
V. SIMULATION EXAMPLE
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to
illustrate the main theoretical results. We consider a scenario
where three sensors monitor three different dynamic processes.
The system parameters are given as follows:
A1 =
[
1.01 0.5
0 0.2
]
,A2 =
[
1.02 0.4
0 0.15
]
,A3 =
[
1.03 0.6
0 0.1
]
,
C1 =
[
1 1
]
,C2 =
[
1 1
]
,C3 =
[
1 1
]
,
Q1 =
[
0.2 0
0 0.2
]
,Q2 =
[
0.1 0
0 0.15
]
,Q3 =
[
0.1 0
0 0.2
]
,
R1 = 1,R2 = 1,R3 = 1.
By solving the optimization problem in (7), the optimal
transmission policy for each sensor is obtained as
s1 =
[
0, 0, 1
]>
, s2 =
[
0, 1, 0
]>
, s3 =
[
1, 0, 0
]>
,
with duty factor f1 = 13 , f2 =
1
3 , f3 =
1
3 , respectively,
and period T = 3. Then, by solving problem P1 using
the proposed B&B algorithm, the optimal attack strategy is
obtained as τ1 = 0, τ2 = 0, τ3 = 2.
The infinite-horizon average estimation error covariance of
the overall system under different scenarios are shown in
Fig. 3. The blue solid line represents the estimation error
covariance under the optimal transmission policy without
attack. The red circle line and the yellow plus line corre-
spond to the estimation performances under the optimal and
randomly generated time synchronization attacks, respectively.
The blue dash-dot line stands for the expected estimation error
covariance when using shift invariant transmission policy that
preserves the same duty factors of optimal one under random
attack, i.e., f1 = 13 , f2 =
1
3 , f3 =
1
3 , T = 27. Here the
expectation is taken with respect to the different choices of
σij , i ∈ N , j = 1, 2, . . . , Di−1 and the randomly generated
attacks. The purple dotted line and the green dotted line are
the corresponding performance bounds derived in Theorem 3.
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Fig. 3. Remote estimation performance under different scenarios.
The red dashed line stands for the estimation error covariance
when using shift invariant transmission policy that achieves the
shortest period, i.e., f1 = 12 , f2 =
1
2 , f3 =
1
2 , T = 8. It can be
observed that the remote estimation error covariance diverges
exponentially fast when the system is under the optimal or
the randomly generated time synchronization attack, which
is consistent with the results obtained in Section III. On the
other hand, the remote estimation error covariance is bounded
when shift invariant transmission policies are adopted, which
demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed countermea-
sure. Moreover, the shift invariant transmission policy with
the shortest period achieves a better performance compared to
that with the same duty factor.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied time synchronization attack against
multi-system scheduling in a remote state estimation scenario.
For the case that the attacker does not have any system
knowledge, we showed that it is able to make the expected
average estimation error covariance of the overall system go
to infinity. For the case that the attacker has full system
knowledge, we proposed an efficient algorithm to solve the
optimal attack that spoofs the least number of sensors and
leads to unbounded average estimation error covariance of the
overall system. To mitigate the attack consequence, we further
proposed countermeasures and characterized the lower and
upper bounds for system estimation performance when using
shift invariant transmission policies. Simulation and compari-
son were provided to demonstrate the analytical results.
For the future work, one possible direction is to investi-
gate optimal sensor schedule, optimal time synchronization
attack and countermeasures when multiple packet reception is
allowed. Additionally, it would be interesting to analyze the
explicit estimation performance when different shift invariant
transmission policies are adopted.
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